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Abstract 
During the 1990s, Latin America experienced a criminal procedural revolution 
(LACPR) when approximately 70% of its countries abandoned their inquisitorial 
system and adopted the U.S. adversarial model. Following the LACPR, the region 
experienced a dramatic increase in crime, consolidating it as one of the most violent 
areas in the world. Despite previous empirical evidence indicating that procedural 
law affects criminal behavior, the effects of the LACPR continue highly unexplored. 
In this paper, we use the Latin American case to evaluate the impact of an 
adversarial reform on crime rates. Exploiting the quasi-experimental 
implementation of the reform in Colombia, we use an event study approach 
combined with differences-in-differences to estimate the reform’s effects on 
criminal activity. Despite the opposite incentives the reform created, we find an 
increase associated with the procedural transformation in overall crime rates (22%), 
violent crime (15%), and property crime (8%).  We also observe a dramatic decrease 
in drug offenses associated with lower arrest rates. Our findings contribute to the 
literature on Latin American crime and the link between procedural law and 
criminal behavior. 
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During the 1990s, Latin America experienced a criminal procedural revolution (LACPR) when 
approximately 70% of its countries abandoned their inquisitorial system and adopted the U.S. 
adversarial model (see Figure 1). The U.S. sponsored and promoted this conversion as part of its 
transnational war on crime initiated by President Clinton in 1995 (McLeod 2010; Veillette et al. 
2007).  Some scholars have identified the LACPR as the most profound legal transformation in 
the region in nearly two centuries (Langer 2007; McLeod 2010).  
The campaign to transform Latin American procedural codes started in the 1960s through 
the U.S. military and economic assistantship programs, which lead to Mexico and Colombia's early 
reforms. However, the massive adoption of the U.S. adversarial model only occurred until the end 
of the Cold War when the National Bipartisan Commission recommended the Reagan 
administration to include a criminal justice reform in the region. A recommendation that Clinton's 
administration continued advancing the following years. The first countries to adopt the U.S. 
model were Guatemala, Argentina, Paraguay, and Venezuela. Latin American countries faced 
several difficulties completing the transition towards U.S. adversariality. Ultimately, only 
Colombia and Chile succeed in implementing the new procedural model as initially planned.  
[Figure 1 Here] 
Almost three decades after the LACPR, Latin America experienced a dramatic rise in crime 
(Bergman 2006, 2018; Brands 2011; Malone 2010; Müller 2018). Although the literature identifies 
Latin America as an exceptionally violent region prior to the reform, the nature of its violence 
changed after the implementation of the LACPR. Before the 1990s, scholars associated Latin 
American violence with military dictatorships and state repression; however, since the mid-1990s, 
researchers began to identify crime as the new form of violence (Bergman 2006, 2018; Müller 
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2018). Notwithstanding the existence of studies linking procedural law and criminal behavior, few 
investigations have explored the impact of procedural reforms on Latin American crime rates. 
Despite its importance, the relationship between the LACPR and the Latin American violence 
crisis remains highly unexplored.   
Previous research on crime in Latin America has focused on exploring how the region’s 
economic and social characteristics affect the incentives to engage in illegal activities (Di Tella, 
Edwards, and Schargrodsky 2010; Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 1998; Soares and Naritomi 
2010). Other scholars use a governance and institutional approach to study crime in Latin America 
(Malone 2010; Müller 2018; Schultze-Kraft, Chinchilla, and Moriconi 2018). Yet, they ignore the 
effect of procedural law on criminal behavior.  
In this paper, we seek to advance the literature on the causes of Latin American soaring 
crime rates and the causal relationship between procedural law and criminal behavior. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is one of the first econometrical investigations evaluating the effects of the 
LACPR in the region. For this purpose, we use Colombia as a case of study, since it offers unique 
conditions to develop a causal inference analysis. Out of the 19 Latin American countries that 
implemented the LACPR, we identify Colombia as the best setting to develop this evaluation. By 
exploiting the Colombian quasi-experimental implementation of the U.S. adversarial model, we 
suggest that adversariality increases crime rates (violent and property offenses) significantly, 
ceteris paribus.  In particular, we find an increase associated with the procedural transformation 
in overall crime rates (22%), violent crime (15%) and property crime (8%). 
  Besides exploring the LACPR effect on crime, we classify the central reform changes using 
the literature on criminal procedural law and illegal activities into three mechanisms: i) celerity, 
ii) certainty and iii) severity. Then, we proceed to test whether those theoretical changes affected 
 
 3 
the behavior of law enforcement and judicial agents. Finally, we compare our findings with the 
theoretical predictions to evaluate the applicability of previous results for the Latin American 
context.  
We organize the paper as follows: Section II discusses previous theoretical and empirical work 
linking procedural law and criminal behavior. In sections III and IV, we discuss the nuances of the 
LACPR and explain in more detail the Colombian case. In the following two segments, we 
describe our data sources and define our methodological strategy. Finally, in the last two parts, we 
present our results followed by our conclusion. 
II. PROCEDURAL LAW & CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 
The literature on crime control has largely documented the role of the penal system on crime 
rates. Some of the most notable work on this area has focused on the impact of sentencing 
(Beyleveld 1979; Walker 1979), incapacitation (Brody and Tarling 1980; Greenwood 1979), and 
rehabilitation (Brody 1986; Martinson, Adams, and Palmer 1976) on criminal behavior. These 
research projects have been extremely important to understand the role that criminal justice plays 
in altering the incentives to engage in illegal activities. However, these approaches usually neglect 
the effects criminal procedure might have on crime rates. Scholars focusing on the relationship 
between procedural law and crime identify three determining factors that influence criminal 
behavior: (i) certainty of adjudication, (ii) severity, and (iii) celerity of punishment. Some of the 
most important findings reveal that criminal procedure affects illegal activity by modifying the 
perception of the probability of punishment (Atkins and Rubin 2003; Dalla Pellegrina 2008; Dušek 
2015; Soares and Sviatschi 2010), intertemporal preferences (Listokin 2007), and the effectiveness 
of the severity of punishment (Nagin and Pogarsky 2003; Pogarsky 2002). 
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Empirical findings have concluded that changes in the certainty of punishment have the 
strongest deterrent effect (Apel and Nagin 2011; Durlauf and Nagin 2010, 2011). Scholars 
associate this deterrent effect to four conditional probabilities: (i) apprehension, given a crime 
commission (police); (ii) being charged, given an apprehension (police & prosecution); (iii) 
conviction, given a criminal charge (prosecution & judge); and (iv) a formal sanction, given a 
sentence (judge & post-sentencing institutions). These probabilities affect the decision to engage 
in illegal activities differently. For instance, from an economic point of view, altering the 
likelihood of being apprehended affects the offender's perception of completing the event 
successfully, while modifying the conviction probability after detection, changes the perception of 
a legal sanction (Nagin, Solow, and Lum 2015).  
Despite recognizing the different procedural stages that influence the likelihood of punishment, 
the literature associates it with the probability of apprehension almost exclusively, and the other 
mechanisms remain largely unexplored. According to Nagin (2013b), offenders respond more to 
changes in criminal opportunity than changes in the likelihood of a legal sanction. Under this view, 
detention prevents the crime’s completion eliminating the gain, which is the initial incentive to 
commit it in the first place (Nagin 2013a; Wilson and McLaren 1972a).   
Scholars studying the role of apprehension on illegal activities explain different responses to 
policing depending on the criminal opportunity. From an environmental criminological 
perspective, targets and locations explicate variation on crime and victimization risk (Bottoms and 
Wiles 1994; Brantingham and Brantingham 1981, 1982, 1984, 1993; Jeffery 1971; Newman 
1972). For instance, paying wages by check or bank deposit makes individuals less vulnerable to 
muggings (changes in the environment) (Clarke 1983). Complementing this view, the opportunity 
perspective focuses on making targets less vulnerable (Clarke 1983, 1995, 1997; Felson and Clarke 
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1995). For example, Clarke (1983) suggests that using automobile steering column locks diminish 
criminal opportunity by making them less vulnerable to robbery (reduction in the opportunity of 
success) (Nagin 2013a; Wilson and McLaren 1972a).  
In addition to the environmental and opportunity perspectives, the literature identifies routine 
activities as determinants of high-or-low-risk situations (Cohen and Felson 2003; Felson 1987; 
Felson and Clarke 1995, 1995, 2004; Groff 2008). Risky situations also depend on place-based 
factors (Jaitman and Anauati 2020; Weisburd 2015). For instance, criminologists have identified 
that houses or businesses next to those recently burglarized have a higher risk of burglary since 
the offenders perceived low risk of apprehension in the area (Bowers and Johnson 2005; Bowers, 
Johnson, and Pease 2004, 2005).   
Empirical studies have also found that street crimes respond more to visible police presence 
than those offenses that occur in private spaces (Andens and Andenæs 1974). This evidence 
suggests that changes in policing activity might affect crime rates differently. For example, an 
increase or decrease in visible police presence might affect muggings and street robberies 
(Sampson and Cohen 1988), but not have a significant influence on domestic assaults (Felson, 
Ackerman, and Gallagher 2005). Additionally, the literature has identified policing activity to be 
proactive and reactive, depending on the offense. Proactive police work appears in situations where 
a violation without a victim occurs, and crime rates depend on arrest rates (i.e., narcotics 
violations) (Black 1970). In contrast, reactive police activity heavily relies on citizen complaints, 
particularly on victims' reports (i.e., assaults and robberies) (Black 1970; Stinchcombe 1963).   
 Even though the probability of apprehension plays a crucial role in the criminal justice 
deterrence effect, transformations in procedural law affect not only the certainty of punishment, 
but also the celerity and severity of legal sanctions. On the certainty side, social researchers have 
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linked increases in criminal convictions with lower crime rates (Pogarsky 2002; Soares and 
Sviatschi 2010). However, Pogarsky (2002) finds evidence that lenient penalties deteriorate the 
effect of the certainty of punishment. Thus, reforms that increase the productivity of the criminal 
justice system but decrease the severity of penalties might have unintended consequences on crime 
rates. For instance, as we will show in this paper, changes associated with plea bargaining can have 
unexpected results since it contributes to procedural efficiency in exchange for shorter prison 
sentences.  
On the one hand, the literature identifies plea bargaining as an essential tool to increase 
conviction rates in short periods (Bushway, Redlich, and Norris 2014; Grossman and Katz 1983). 
On the other hand, empirical evidence reveals that defendants who pled guilty tend to receive 
substantially shorter sentences (Albonetti 1990, 1997; Bushway et al. 2014; Smith 1986; Ulmer 
and Bradley 2006; Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson 2010). However, the literature has overlooked 
the relationship between plea bargaining and criminal behavior.  
On celerity and severity, authors focusing on the process length claim that rational 
offenders discount future punishment, therefore increasing the temporal gap between the event and 
the penalty decreases the sanction value (Davis 1988; Lee and McCrary 2005; Listokin 2007; 
Polinsky and Shavell 1979). Research conducted in Italy (Dalla Pellegrina 2008), the Czech 
Republic (Dušek 2015; Dušek and Traxler 2016), and Costa Rica (Soares and Sviatschi 2010) 
shows that procedural length and crime rates are negatively correlated. However, Dusek (2015) 
warns that, while shorter and simpler procedures might reduce the lag between crime and 
punishment, these changes can alter the incentives of law enforcement agents to allocate resources 
in each phase of the process.  
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Empirical work has documented the responses of law enforcement agents to procedural 
law transformations in the U.S., Europe, and Latin America. In the U.S., legal scholars have 
explored the effects of changes in the "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" standard of proof (Stuntz 
1997)5 and the evidence rules (Atkins and Rubin 2003; Nardulli 1983) in crime rates, concluding 
that police and prosecutors allocate fewer resources in activities with stricter criminal procedure 
regulations. Concretely, Atkins and Ruben (2003), studying the effects of the exclusionary rule in 
the 1960s (see Mapp v. Ohio 1961, Gideon v. Wainwright 1963, Miranda v. Arizona 1966) find 
that stricter criminal procedure rules that favored the defendant increased property crimes, 
contradicting Nardelli's (1983) results. 
In the European case, Dusek (2015) studies the implementation of a fast-track proceeding 
for minor offenses in the Czech Republic, finding that prosecutors and police officers transferred 
resources from severe crimes to less serious cases. According to his study, reduction in procedural 
length for minor offenses decreased the relative price of pursuing them, causing the observed 
substitution. Finally, Hausman and Kronick (2019) explore the effects of imposing restrictions on 
arrests and evidence collection in Colombia and Venezuela. Their findings suggest that in 
Venezuela, police decided to allocate more resources to illegal forms of crime control instead of 
formal criminal justice mechanisms after the change. In contrast, the authors find that in Colombia, 
a severe decrease in arrest rates occurred after the introduction of those restrictions.6  
 
5 Stuntz (1997) suggests that, the "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" requirement imposes a heavy burden of proof skewing 
errors in favor of the defendant. Although this constitutional requirement affects the probability of conviction, Stuntz 
argues that the underlying legitimacy of the criminal justice system relies on the high standards to obtain a criminal 
conviction. In addition to the allocation of the burden of proof, Stuntz explains that the criminal procedure extensively 
regulates the conduct of the agents that participate in the system (e.g., police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys), 
intending to protect the defendants' rights to be free from certain kinds of government behavior. While the literature 
on criminal procedure recognizes that a decrease in the protection of the defendants' rights might increase the certainty 
of punishment, it is not a desirable solution considering that the criminal justice system tends to discriminate against 
the poorest and most vulnerable sectors of the population (Listokin 2007; Stuntz 1997). 
6 Hausman and Kronick (2019) explore the effects of the LACPR in crime rates in Venezuela and Colombia. We re-
estimate the effect of the reform in arrest rates per 100,000 inhabitants confirming their findings.  
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Despite the theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that changes in the certainty, 
celerity, and severity of the punishment cannot be separated one from the other, the literature 
exploring the relationship between procedural law and criminal behavior continues to analyze 
these factors separately. Moreover, different empirical studies often provide contradictory 
evidence on how procedural reforms modify the probability of conviction or detention, and how 
individuals respond to those changes. Most of these opposite conclusions come from studying 
specific transformations rather than looking at the entire criminal justice system. In this paper, we 
use the LACPR to evaluate the effects of an adversarial procedural model on crime rates.  
Evaluating adversariality as a whole—instead of studying isolated phases—allows us to 
better understand the procedural law's impact on the offender's and law enforcement agent's 
decisions. Furthermore, our paper contributes to the literature by explaining other ways in which 
experiences with the penal system triggers upward revisions in probabilities of apprehension, 
conviction, and punishment imposition (Kohler-Hausmann 2018; Lochner 2007; Tyler 2006; Tyler 
and Huo 2002).  
III. THE U.S. ADVERSARIAL MODEL EXPERIMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
Estimating the effect of the U.S. adversarial model in Latin American criminality is a challenging 
task due to the lack of good quality micro-data, the heterogeneity across countries, and the different 
levels of intervention in each one of them. However, the staggered implementation of the LACPR 
in Colombia (2005-2008), Perú (2006-2013),7 México (2005-2016),8 and Chile (2000-2005) offers 
 
7 The Peruvian case used a gradual implementation of the reform that started in 2006 and ended in 2013. The 
implementation took longer than expected originally due to budget constraints that led to the suspension of the 
implementation process in 2011.  In contrast to the Colombian case that implemented the new adversarial model the 
next immediate year after the promulgation of the new code, it took the Peruvian government two years to start the 
implementation process.  
8 The Mexican reform started in 2008 with the constitutional reform and it was finally enacted in 2014. The 
implementation of the reform in each state depended on local government efforts and only until 2016 more than fifty 




unique potential settings to evaluate its effects. From these four potential cases of study, we 
consider Colombia and Chile to be the most successful cases executing their rolling-out process 
as they are the only countries that implemented it in their originally planned dates  (CEJA 2015; 
de Luca 2008).  
Despite their similarities, the gradual implementation in Colombia and Chile followed 
different temporal and geographic patterns. Chile introduced the reform in five waves, starting in 
December 2000 and finishing in June 2002. To facilitate the transition, Chile reserved all 
metropolitan regions for the final stage representing 40.1% of the population (Gendarmeria de 
Chile 2000). In contrast, Colombia implemented the U.S. adversarial model in four waves, starting 
in January 2005 and finishing in January 2008. In each stage of the reform in Colombia, the reform 
covered approximately 25% of the population without separating rural and urban areas in specific 
waves (see Figure 2).  
[Figure 2 Here] 
By comparing both implementation processes, we identify Colombia as a better quasi-
experimental setting than Chile. In the first place, empirical evidence suggests that criminal 
activity and population type (urban and rural) are highly correlated (Berg and Lauritsen 2016; 
Bergman 2018; Jaitman and Anauati 2020; Sampson 1983, 1985; Vilalta 2020) and thus, the 
implementation order in Chile might not be exogenous to each stage's crime rates. On the contrary, 
at first sight, the homogeneous distribution of the reform in Colombia appears as an arguable 
exogenous process. To rule out a connection between the implementation order in Colombia and 
its crime rates, we reviewed the 22 versions of the procedural code drafted by the Colombian 
Congress and the four legislative debates in the Senate and House of Representatives and did not 
find a direct reference to the rolling-out order and crime.    
 
 10 
In the second place, the implementation in Chile occurred in different months of the year 
introducing seasonality variation which makes it considerably harder to separately identify both 
the effect of the reform and the seasonality of some crime outcomes (Chamlin 1988; Corman and 
Mocan 2005; Draca, Machin, and Witt 2011; McDowall, Loftin, and Pate 2012; Ratcliffe 2010). 
Once again, the consistent implementation of the Colombian reform in January during the four-
year rolling-out process helps us control for this source of variation, offering a unique quasi-
experimental setting for our study. 
Besides the advantages of this quasi-experimental implementation, the literature identifies 
Colombia as the closest country to the U.S. in the region (Langer 2007; McLeod 2010; Stokes 
2003). During the 1990s, the U.S. created the Plan Colombia—a major counter-narcotics and 
criminal justice reform program—transforming Colombia in one of the largest recipients of U.S. 
military and financial aid in the world (Mejía 2012; Stokes 2003). As part of this foreign aid 
program, the U.S. directly influenced Colombia's justice reform and crime priorities while 
monitoring the progress of the country.  
Following the creation of Plan Colombia, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) urged 
Colombia to transform its penal procedural code following the U.S. adversarial model. 
Consequently, in 2004, Colombia enacted a new procedural code (Law 906/04) adopting this 
model. The change not only responded to foreign, but also to national pressures. The small number 
of solved cases and the high levels of due process violations affected the legitimacy of the old 
criminal procedural system (Law 600/00). Under the Law 600/00, prosecutors served a dual role 
as investigators and adjudicators in long written and private procedures. This model overloaded 
the Colombian system. By 2004, the system produced a low number of convictions every year 
(Martínez Cuéllar, Hernández Luna, and Parra González 2008; Zorro Medina 2020b) and 
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excessively relied on pre-trial detention as a form of crime control  (Carranza 2001; Duce, Fuentes, 
and Riego 2009; Zorro Medina 2020a). 
The national sentiment of impunity and arbitrariness motivated the Colombian elites to 
align their agenda with the U.S.’s desire to export its procedural model to the region, allowing for 
a higher participation level of the DOJ. During the reformation process, the DOJ contributed to 
the legislative debates and directly wrote parts of the new Colombian code (Law 906/04).9 The 
Law 906/04 transformed the entire Colombian process from the pre-investigation stage to the trial, 
without changing the post-sentencing procedure. Figure 3 summarizes the four parts of the 
Colombian criminal system before and after the reform. 
[Figure 3 Here] 
As Figure 3 shows, the main change during the pre-investigation stage consisted of moving 
the statute of limitations to operate before the formulation of imputation. This change intended to 
reduce the process length to increase the number of convictions while reducing the time a person 
spends in pre-trial detention. This structural change imposed rigid deadlines to prosecutors during 
the post-imputation phase forcing them to only formulate an imputation once the investigation has 
been completed. Figure 4 confirms the reform success in reducing the process length. However, it 
also suggests that a substitution effect might have occurred since the number of days between 
opening an investigation and the formulation of imputation increased substantially.  
[Figure 4 Here] 
A second major transformation during the investigation phase consisted of forcing both 
parties to have a settlement hearing for some types of crime, including property crimes and 
assaults, among others. With this measure, the reform intended to decrease the number of cases 
 
9 While the DOJ worked with all Latin American governments that adopted the U.S. adversarial model, Colombia is 
the only country that permitted the DOJ direct intervention in the legislative debate (Langer 2007).  
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that ended in a formulation of imputation. This new procedural requirement might have 
contributed to the increase in the number of days between phases 1 and 2 (see Figure 3). 
After the investigation phase, the reform included an impartial referee to decide whether 
pre-trial detention was necessary. The introduction of the Supervisory Judge (Juez de Control de 
Garantías-SJ) eliminated the adjudication functions that the prosecutor had between the 
formulation of imputation and accusation (see Figure 3 phases 2 and 3). Under this new model, 
prosecutors lost their ability to unilaterally impose preventive measures before trial; therefore, the 
government expected a decrease in the use of pre-trial detention. Zorro-Medina (2020a) shows that 
the reform decreased the number of persons in pre-trial detention, as intended.  
Finally, the reform affected the trial stage by converting it into an oral public hearing. In 
addition to this structural change, the reform included new forms to terminate the criminal process: 
guilty pleas. Despite the pre-existence of agreements between the accused and prosecutor, those 
agreements never replaced the trial phase. Moreover, Law 600/00 listed the benefits an accused 
would obtain from accepting charges. In contrast, the new model (Law 906/04) gave prosecutors 
discretion to decide whether to offer a plea deal and the benefits from it. Zorro Medina (2020b) 
argues that the introduction of plea bargaining and the increase in prison sentences after the reform 
are highly correlated. In the same line, Figure 5 suggests that the decrease in the number of days 
between the investigation opening and a sentence seems to come from convictions and not from 
acquittals.  
[Figure 5 Here] 
Despite the radical transformation of the Colombian criminal procedure and the large-scale 
implementation of the U.S. adversarial model in the region, little research exploring the effects of 
the LACPR exists. Few studies have investigated the reform impact in prison conditions (Duce et 
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al. 2009; Hartmann Arboleda, Gómez, and Ortíz 2009; Zorro Medina 2020a, 2020b), but the 
impact it had on crime rates remains highly unexplored. In this paper, we attempt to provide one 
of the first major evaluations of the U.S. model in Latin America, while contributing to the 
literature on procedural law and crime rates. The introduction of the U.S. adversarial model 
transformed the certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment all at the same time, making unclear 
its effect on criminal behavior. In the next section, we explain in more detail the channels and 
mechanisms that we investigate in this paper.  
IV. THE COLOMBIAN REFORM AND CRIME RATES 
Besides exploring the effect of the U.S. adversarial model in Colombia, we intent on testing 
previous hypothesizes identified by the literature on other contexts on how procedural law affects 
criminal behavior. Figure 6 summarizes the nine channels through which the LACPR potentially 
affected criminal behavior and crime rates. We link each change with celerity (Mechanism 1), 
certainty (Mechanism 2), or severity (Mechanism 3). Figure 6 shows that, the literature suggests 
that the effect of the LACPR on crime rates is ambiguous. On the one side, the reform could have 
caused an increase in criminal behavior or a decrease in crime rates.10  
[Figure 6 Here] 
For Mechanism 1, we recognize that changes in the statute of limitations and strict 
deadlines to finish each phase after imputation affected procedural celerity differently. On one 
hand, and as shown in Figure 3, the gap between the event and imputation increased (Mechanism 
1A). However, the time difference between imputation and sentencing decreased substantially 
(Mechanism 1B). Comparing both effects, Figure 5 suggests that the reduction in procedural times 
post-imputation is larger than the pre-imputation increase (Mechanism 1C). Focusing only on the 
 
10 We distinguish between criminal behavior and crime rates. We associated the former with actual illegal activity and 
the latter with how societies measure crime (Black 1970). 
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celerity effect, we predict that crime rates would decrease. Still, the delay in imputations has an 
additional impact since it postpones pre-trial detention requests, which affects the incapacitation 
effect of detention. Moreover, if the offender perceives pre-trial detention as a form of 
"punishment" or negative cost for criminal behavior, this delay would decrease the intertemporal 
value of the sanction. 
Regarding certainty (Mechanism 2), the LACPR theoretically modified different 
conditional probabilities.  First, it introduced stricter arrest rules to favor the rights of the defendant 
(Mechanism 2A). Following Atkins and Ruben (2003) and Hausman and Kronick's (2019) work, 
we anticipate a reduction in police activity related to arrests (probability of apprehension) and an 
increase in criminal behavior (Atkins and Ruben 2003). However, we expect that if this mechanism 
affected crime rates, we should only observe higher rates for offenses associated with reactive 
policing (i.e., robberies) and a decrease with those linked to proactive policing (i.e., drug offenses). 
To differentiate between street crime (i.e., muggings) from those occurring in private settings (i.e., 
sexual offenses), we include both types of crimes in our analysis.  
The second certainty mechanism (2B) represents the introduction of stricter rules to request 
and impose pre-trial detention. Once again, this modification creates incentives for prosecutors 
and police officers to allocate fewer resources to pre-trial detention requests and focus on other 
procedural phases. Although pre-trial detention is not a sanction, for the offender, it represents a 
negative consequence of the illegal activity as it deprives his or her liberty. Hence, the change in 
the incentives of law enforcement agents reduces the probability of being detained and delays 
detention, affecting the perceived value of the sanction.  
The last certainty mechanism (2C) is associated with the efforts to increase the criminal 
justice sentencing rate. The LACPR introduced plea bargaining to augment convictions at a lower 
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procedural cost. As discussed earlier, the literature relates plea bargaining with high conviction 
numbers, increasing the probability of conviction given being charged. From this effect, we would 
predict a decrease in criminal behavior. Nevertheless, it would depend on whether the likelihood 
of conviction given being charged has a higher impact than the reduction in the probability of 
apprehension. 
Finally, Mechanism 3 is severity. The LACPR influenced the punishment severity without 
transforming any penalty. Since Colombia is a civil law country, the Penal Code lists all sanctions 
and guidelines to individualize them. The modifications came from the offender's intertemporal 
discounts. First, Mechanism 3A increased the value of the penalty by reducing the time between 
the event and the eventual punishment (connected to Mechanism 1C). Secondly, the settlement 
hearing requirement (Mechanism 3B) increases the likelihood that more cases do not end in formal 
criminal charges, reducing the value of the sanction. By making it a condition to formulate 
imputation and a fast way to close cases, prosecutors have incentives to promote quick settlements 
between the victim and the offender, at the cost of considerably reducing the severity of the 
punishment. Finally, Mechanism 3C includes the potential reduction in prison sentences from 
guilty-plea negotiations. Once again, prosecutors have incentives to allocate more resources into 
plea negotiations since they can achieve higher conviction rates in shorter periods at lower costs. 
After summarizing the LACPR modifications that potentially altered criminal behavior and 
crime rates, we continue our empirical analysis by estimating the effect of the reform on crime 
rates. Later, we present the evidence suggesting that our nine theoretical mechanisms actually 




 To explore the impact of the U.S. adversarial model on Colombian crime rates, we use data 
from four sources. First, the Colombian National Police Department (NPD) provided the 
municipality monthly arrest and crime data from 2003 to 2008. We restrict our analysis to high 
impact social crimes, and from that subset, we selected those with lower measurement problems: 
homicides, assaults, muggings, business robberies, home burglaries, and vehicle thefts (De Mello, 
Mejía, and Suárez 2013; Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004). According to the Colombian NPD,  
these six crime categories represented 97% of Colombian high impact social crimes in 2005 
(Policía Nacional de Colombia-DIJIN 2005).11 Additionally, we include sexual and drug offenses 
between 2004-2008 from the System of Statistical Information on Crime, Violations and Arrests 
(Sistema de Información Estadístico, Delincuencial, Crontravencional y Operativo de la Policia 
Nacional-SIEDCO). As mentioned in Section II, sexual (highly dependent on victims' report)12 
and drug (highly reliant on police activity) offenses capture a different relationship between crime 
rates and law enforcement agents than the selected high impact crimes. Therefore, we include these 
offenses to study the variations in crime and victimization risk (Stinchcombe 1963, Black 1970).   
 Using the information provided by the NPD, we constructed four aggregated measures: i) 
unweighted crime rate, ii) weighted crime index, iii) weighted violent crime index, and iv) 
weighted property crime index. We excluded sexual and drug offenses from these indices since 
we do not have these crimes information for 2003.13 We created the aggregated weighted measures 
using the following equation similar to Ortega et al. (2015):  
 
11 We exclude offenses related with the Colombian conflict, which represent the remaining 3% of these high social 
impact crimes (extorsion, kidnapping, and terrorism) (Policía Nacional de Colombia-DIJIN 2005) 
12 In Colombia prostitution is not a crime, therefore sexual offenses do not include it, neither soliciting it. According 
to official data, by 2004 the majority of sexual offense were minors (84.3%) and aggressors are usually well-known 
by the victim (i.e. family members) (Medicina Legal 2005) 
13 We estimated our models using an alternative measure including sexual and drug offenses, and the results do not 
change substantially.  
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𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑ (
𝑝𝑠
∑ 𝑝𝑠′𝑠′∈ 𝐶
∗ 𝑆𝑖,𝑡)𝑠∈𝐶                                                       (1) 
where 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 represents one of the three crime indices (total, violent, or property) in municipality 𝑖, 
for month 𝑡; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the crime rate for index 𝑠, in municipality 𝑖, during month 𝑡, expressed in terms 
of crime incidences per 100,000 inhabitants, and 𝑝𝑠 is the average sentence length in years for 
individuals convicted of crime 𝑠.14 Table 1 reports the weights (𝑝𝑠)  we use in equation (1). 
[Table 1 Here] 
Second, we use the yearly population projections published by the Colombian National 
Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Nacional de Estadísticas-DANE).15 Third, 
the Center for Economic Development at Universidad de Los Andes (CEDE) supplied us with the 
municipality-year data to control for socioeconomic and demographic differences. The CEDE 
panel includes information on education, income, inequality, forced displacement, and rural index 
of each municipality from 2000 to 2008. For our analysis, we use five variables traditionally 
identified by the literature as determinants of crime: (i) income per capita measured as average 
income per capita in the municipality (Crutchfield 1989; Hipp 2007; Messner and Tardiff 1986; 
Verbruggen et al. 2015); (ii) institutional capacity, included as a municipality fiscal performance 
index (Chamlin and Cochran 1995; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Rosenfeld and Messner 2006); 
(iii) rural index (Deller and Deller 2011; Kowalski and Duffield 1990; Ladbrook 1988; Lyerly and 
Skipper Jr 1981; Wells and Weisheit 2004); (iv) education, using as proxy municipal expenditure 
on education per capita (Buonanno and Leonida 2006; Hjalmarsson and Lochner 2012; Lochner 
2004; Lochner and Moretti 2004); and (v) population density (Lobonţ et al. 2017; Sampson 1983; 
 
14 Average sentence length was calculated using the Penal Code of 2007. To calculate the maximum sentence length, 
we used the maximum prison sentence for each crime corrected by the maximum prison sentenced in case of an 
aggravating circumstance.  
15 By the time we wrote this paper, the latest census in the country was the 2005 Colombian census.  
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Shichor, Decker, and O’BRIEN 1979; Shichor, Decker, and O’Brien 1980). Table 2 displays 
descriptive statistics of relevant variables in these three data sources.  
[Table 2 Here] 
 Finally, the National Prosecutorial Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación-FGN) provided 
information related to Mechanisms 1 to 3 (see Figure 5). We temporally accessed the Prosecutorial 
Information System for Law 900/04 (Sistema Penal Oral Acusatorio- Ley 904 & Ley 1098-SPOA) 
and the Prosecutorial Information System for Law 600 (Sistema de Información Judicial Ley 
600/00-SIJUF). These two systems contain case-level data since 2004 for all the Colombian 
municipalities. From the SPOA and SIJUF, we obtained information at the municipality-month 
level on (i) the number of days between procedural stages, (ii) the number of imputations, (iii) the 
number of active cases, (iv) the number of cases with a preventive measure (house arrest or jail 
detention), (v) the number of settlements (before imputation), (vi) the number of convictions (in 
court or guilty pleas), and (vii) the number of acquittals (in court or agreements).  
VI. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
For this analysis, we estimate the effect of introducing the U.S. adversarial model on crime 
rates by exploiting the variation resulting from the staggered implementation of the LACPR in 
Colombia. As mentioned before, we divide our study into two components. First, we explore 
whether the U.S. adversarial model increased or decreased crime rates in the country. Second, we 
study the potential mechanisms through which this model affected criminality in Colombia. To do 
this, we use two empirical approaches. First, we estimate an event study model following the 
Granger-Type Causality test structure to examine whether the control and treatment groups had 
parallel trends during the pre-treatment period (2003-2004). We extended this model to the post-
 
 19 
treatment period (2005-2008) to capture phase-in effects in addition to anticipation effects. 
Equation 2 represents this unconditional leads-and-lags model: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑠 = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑚
𝑚
𝑚=−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑝𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑝
𝑝
𝑝=0 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡                        (2) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑠   represents the crime rate in municipality i and period t of one of the following types of 
crime s: (i) unweighted crime rate; (ii) crime index; (iii) violent crime index; (iv) property crime 
index; (v) homicides, (vi) assaults, (vii) sexual offenses; (viii) drug offenses, (ix) muggings, (x) 
business robberies, (xi) vehicle thefts, and (xii) home burglaries. The term ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑚
𝑚
𝑚=−1  
denotes the sequence of lagged treatment variables (m=-1,…,-12 months), capturing the potential 
differences in the pre-treatment period between treatment and control groups. On the other hand,  
∑ 𝛾𝑝𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑝
𝑝
𝑝=0  denotes the present and future treatment sequence (p=0,…,12 months), capturing 
the LACPR effect in the outcome variables. This leads-and-lags structure includes municipality 
(𝛿𝑖) fixed effects, year-month, year and month (𝜇𝑡) fixed effects, and municipality cluster standard 
errors. Although the implementation uses judicial districts for treatment assignment, their number 
is too small and clustering at this level would not be ideal (Cameron and Miller 2015). 
 In addition to the unconditional evaluation of the parallel trends and phase-in effects, we 
estimate a conditional version of equation (2). In this modified model, we include a vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 
containing the economic, demographic, and institutional variables mentioned in the previous 
section to control for time-varying municipality characteristics. Additionally, we incorporate  
𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑤 representing the lag of police arrests, in order to avoid endogeneity problems (Listokin 
2003; Pfaff 2008; Rosenfeld and Wallman 2019).  
 Besides the main results we obtained from equation (2), we use this model to estimate 
statistical differences during the pre-treatment period for vectors 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑤. For variables in 
vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, we utilize the yearly-municipality information provided by the CEDE between 2000-
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2004 and restricted the analysis to the pre-treatment period. In contrast, for 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑤, we estimate the 
unconditional leads-and-lags model represented in equation (2) to explore the LACPR effects on 
arrest rates as a potential mechanism through which the reform affected crime (see Figure 5, 
Mechanism 2A).  
 In our second empirical exercise, we exploit the gradual reform implementation using a 
difference-in-difference model with variation in the timing of the treatment (Goodman-Bacon 
2018; Wing, Simon, and Bello-Gomez 2018).  Formally, we estimate the following model: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽3𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑤 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡                         (3) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑠  represents the already mentioned crime outcomes for type of crime s in municipality i 
at period t. Variable 𝐿𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is a binary variable indicating whether the reform has been 
implemented in a municipality. Vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 contains the control variables. Since the lag-structure 
introduced by 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑤 imposes restrictions on placebo tests during the pre-treatment period, we 
incorporate an alternative estimation excluding 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑤. The exclusion of  𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑤 does not affect the 
results significantly. We present these alternative results in the methodological appendix with the 
robustness and placebo checks. We also include time fixed effects (𝜇𝑡) to control for national 
trends and cyclicality in crime rates. Likewise, municipality fixed effects (𝛿𝑖) control for non-
observable and time-invariant prison-municipality characteristics, and for differences in the 
propensity to report data.16 Lastly, the term 𝑖,𝑡 represents a municipality-clustered error. 
 To explore Mechanisms 1 to 3 (see Figure 6), we estimate equation (3) using as dependent 
variables (i) clearance rates, (ii) preventive measures (jail detention or house arrest), (iii) 
settlements, and (iv) sentences (acquittals or convictions). Recognizing the difficulties in 
 
16 We attempted including municipality-time fixed effects or judicial districts-time fixed effects, but the number of 
observations is insufficient. Considering that the parallel trends and exogeneity assumption hold without conditioning 
by them, we argue our estimators are unbiased. 
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measuring changes in judicial and prosecutorial activity (Berggren and Gutmann 2020; Marciano, 
Melcarne, and Ramello 2019), we proposed two types of indicators. First, we construct rates 
allowing for information delays and timespans between denominator and numerator (CEPEJ 2014; 


















                                             (5) 
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑠 =






                            (6) 
In the second group, we propose rates controlling for the total number of cases when no 
logical time-gap between denominator and numerator exists: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑠 =
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑠
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑠                                  (7) 
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 
𝑠 =
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝑠
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝑠                        (8) 
 Finally, in all our estimations, we use dependent variables and arrest information 
normalized by 100,000 inhabitants. Additionally, we use logarithmic transformations of all 
dependent (𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑠 ) and cofounding variables (𝑋𝑖,𝑡; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑤) to allow for non-linear relationships. To 
avoid losing information caused by zero values, we used a ln(A+1) transformation. 
VII. RESULTS 
Main Results: Crime Rates 
The findings from the leads-and-lags model (model 1) suggest that treatment and control 
groups had parallel trends, and no-anticipation effects occurred before the implementation of the 
reform. Figure 7 shows the outcomes for the aggregated crime rates between 2004 and 2005. 
Figures 8 and 10 display the results for the eight individual offenses studied over the same period. 
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These figures corroborate that during the pre-treatment period (𝑚 = −1, … , −12), the difference 
between treatment and control groups was statistically equal to zero (𝛾𝑚 = 0).
17  
During the post-treatment period (𝑝 = 0, … ,12), Figure 6 reveals that the U.S. adversarial 
model lead to an increase across all aggregated crime rates in Colombia. We observe a seasonality 
effect in the property crime index, and a consistent increase in the violent crime index for 𝑝 =
0, … ,7. 
[Figure 7 Here] 
 Looking at individual offenses, we find that the reform effect varies depending on the type 
of crime. For violent crimes, the increase seems to be completely driven by an increase in assaults. 
For homicides and sex offenses, we do not see a consistent effect. Figure 8 shows an initial positive 
impact of the reform in sex crimes; however, since this is an unconditional model, we recognize 
that the variation could be potentially correlated with other confounding variables. We explore 
more of these effects in our difference-in-difference model. Additionally, Figure 8 reveals a 
decrease in drug offenses for 𝑝 = 0, … ,12. These differential effects suggest that the mechanisms 
identified in Figure 8 affect criminal activities differently, as predicted by the literature. 
[Figure 8 Here] 
 As mentioned previously, the report of drug offenses is different from the other crimes 
studied in this paper since, in most cases, they do not harm another person. Thus, these crimes are 
primarily dependent on police activity (Mechanism 2A, Figure 6). We estimate the unconditional 
leads-and-lag model to evaluate whether the LACPR altered arrest patterns that could have caused 
a decrease in the drug offenses report (lower probability of apprehension). We report those results 
in Figure 9. According to our findings, after the LACPR, the arrest rates per 100,000 inhabitants 
 
17 The restricted version of model 1 does not show significant differences with Figures 7, 8, and 10. We included only 
the unrestricted model results since they support the existence of parallel trends without any conditional adjustment.  
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suffered a drastic reduction.  While our data does not allow us to estimate the changes in the risk 
of drug arrests, previous literature has identified drug offenses as generally available in terms of 
arrests since policing activity in these cases tends to be proactive rather than reactive (Blumstein 
1995; Mitchell and Caudy 2015; Tonry 1995; Tonry and Melewski 2008; Warner and Coomer 
2003).  
[Figure 9 Here]  
 For the specific property crime offenses, we spotted the same seasonality observed in the 
aggregated property crime index.  Figure 10 shows a seasonal increase in all four crimes; however, 
the effect is observed in different months of the post-treatment period. For muggings and business 
robberies, Figure 10 illustrates an increase at the moment the LACPR occurred and at the end of 
the year.  In contrast, for vehicle thefts and home burglaries, the LACPR caused an effect only 
after the fifth month (𝑝 = 5). A potential explanation of these disparities within property crimes 
could be related to what the literature calls the "hot products" market, and the criminal opportunity 
discussed earlier in this paper. Differences in the "hot product" availability  (Clarke and Webb 
1999; Sparks 1980; Wilkins 1971), disposable facilities (Langworthy and LeBeau 1992; Sutton 
1995, 2010; Sutton, Johnston, and Lockwood 1998), and removable complications (Clarke and 
Webb 1999; Pease 1997) shape the crime cycles of each illegal market.  
[Figure 10 Here] 
 Before estimating our difference-in-difference specification, we use the leads-and-lags 
model to assess potential differences in our treatment and control groups in any of the 
socioeconomic factors included in model 2. Figure 11 illustrates that, except for population 
density, our treatment and control groups had parallel trends during the five years before the 
LACPR implementation. To confirm that the parallel trends assumption continues to be valid after 
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the inclusion of vectors 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑤, we estimate model 1 including these confounding 
variables. Table 3 confirms the results presented in Figures 6 to 9.  
[Figure 11 Here] 
[Table 3 Here] 
 Continuing to the difference-in-difference model, Table 4 presents the results for 
aggregated crime measures, which confirm that the U.S. adversarial model caused an increase in 
crime rates in Colombia. Our findings suggest that the LACPR caused a rise of 22% in overall 
crime, 15% in violent crime, and 8% in property crime. After including an exposure time variable, 
we find that a 12-month exposure to the U.S. adversarial model caused a growth of 34% in total 
crime, 17% in violent crime, and 18% in property crime.  
[Table 4 Here] 
For each violent crime, we find that the rise in assault rates (25%) drives most of the effect 
of the reform in this category. Table 5 shows that no statistically significant impact occurred in 
sexual offenses, and a small increase of 3% in homicides happened after the reform. Moreover, 
our results indicate that after a 12-month exposure, the assault rate increased by 30%. In contrast 
to the effect on violent crimes, Table 5 ratifies the decrease in drug offenses observed in Figure 7. 
These findings reveal a 26% reduction in drug offenses after the LACPR implementation and a 
12% reduction after exposure of 12-months.    
[Table 5 Here] 
For property crimes, our estimations suggest that the adversarial model caused a significant 
increase in all four offenses. We observe the highest impact in muggings (9%), followed by home 
burglaries (6%). For business robberies and vehicle thefts, we find a rise of 4% and 2% respectively 
(see Table 6). Furthermore, Panel B shows that after 12-months of exposure to the reform, 
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muggings increased 22%, business robberies 9%, and home burglaries 11%. In contrast, vehicle 
thefts experienced a deceleration in its increase rate after 12-months of exposure, with an increase 
of only 1%.  
[Table 6 Here] 
From our results, we conclude that besides drug and sex offenses, the U.S. adversarial 
model caused an increase in Colombian crime rates. In the case of drug offenses, we believe that 
the decrease observed in Figure 8 and Table 5 is associated with the decline in arrest rates seen in 
Figure 9. However, the mechanisms through which the LACPR affected other illegal activity are 
still unclear until we verify whether any of the nine theoretical predictions materialized in real 
modifications. As mentioned previously, we proposed four categories to explore the nine possible 
ways that could have affected criminal behavior (see Figure 6): (i) clearance rates, (ii) preventive 
measures, (iii) settlements, and (iv) plea bargaining. We explore each one of these mechanisms in 
the following subsection. 
 
Secondary Results: Identifying Potential Mechanisms 
Clearance Rates 
We discussed the reform’s change on the statute of limitations earlier, and we show that 
the number of days between opening an investigation or crime date and the imputation increased 
(see Figure 4). This delay in formulating an imputation postponed the formal initiation of a 
criminal case, which can lead to consequences in illegal activity. As explained before, previous 
literature associates procedural delays with higher crime rates (intertemporal discount). To explore 
this channel, we evaluate the reform's impact on the number of imputations. Using model 2, we 
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assess the effects on clearance rates (defined in Equation 4).  Table 7 reveals that after the reform, 
the clearance rate decreased for all crimes.18  
[Table 7 Here] 
Preventive Measures 
As discussed previously, the low number of yearly convictions made Colombia crime 
control extremely dependent on pre-trial detention, like many other countries in the region.19  
Before the LACPR, the Colombian system only resolved 21% of new cases, while pre-trial 
detainees represented more than 50% of the incarcerated population. Under the previous 
legislation, prosecutors imputed charges in the early stages of the investigation to take advantage 
of the pre-trial detention’s incapacitation effect. However, by reducing the number of imputations, 
the reform could have affected the levels of pre-trial detainees. Zorro-Medina (2020a) shows that 
the LACPR caused a decrease in the number of pre-trial detainees in the penitentiary system; 
however, her results do not explore changes in the imputations numbers.  
In our analysis, we evaluate what happened with pre-trial detention using the ratio 
expressed in Equation 7. Table 8 reveals that after the LACPR, pre-trial detention in jail decreased 
for all crimes, although for property crimes and sex offenses this effect is not significantly different 
from zero. Additionally, it shows an increase in the use of house-arrest for all crimes, including 
property offenses.20  
[Table 8 Here] 
 
18 The FGN only provided an aggregated variable of property crimes (muggings, vehicle thefts, business robberies, 
and home burglaries), thus we only tested these mechanisms for these property crime measure.  
19 During the 1990s, Colombia housed 43,000 inmates in spaces with a capacity for less than 30,000 people; Peru held 
28,000 people in centers with capacity of 20,000; Venezuela held between 24,000 and 27,000 in facilities built to hold 
15,426 inmates; and Chile, housed sixteen inmates in cells built for six persons (Ungar 2003; Zorro Medina 2020a). 
20 We did not include exposure time in these results as introducing the exposure variable does not change the results 
and it is not statistically significant.  
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We speculate that losing the incapacitation effect of pre-trial detention in jail could have 
led to an increase in crime rates. However, we do not have information on whether those persons 
sent to house-arrest or not-held in jail re-offended during the trial. We leave this issue for further 
research. 
Another hypothesis identified by the literature suggests that, while pre-trial detention 
decreased, the number of people entering jail during trial increased. Zorro-Medina (2020) shows 
that the number of pre-trial entries and releases to jail increased after the LACPR, explaining that 
the rotation increased even if the number of total detentions went down. Previous empirical work 
on the effect of pre-trial detention on crime rates in the U.S. suggests that while the incapacitation 
effect reduces criminal activity in the short-term, it might lead to new criminal charges in the long-
term (Heaton, Mayson, and Stevenson 2017; Leslie and Pope 2017) 
Settlements 
The third channel we explore is the settlement hearing required before the formulation of 
imputation for property crimes and assaults. Table 9 displays the results of the difference-in-
difference model using settlement rates as the dependent variable (see Equation 5). From these 
results, we observe an increase in settlements after the LACPR implementation. 
[Table 9 Here] 
As we discussed previously, the settlement hearing can affect criminal behavior by 
increasing the temporal gap between the event and punishment, decreasing the intertemporal value 
of the sanction. Additionally, since these agreements take place before a formal criminal process 
initiates, it removes prison or other non-monetary penalties as potential consequences from the 
illegal activity, reducing, even more, the severity of punishment. This new requirement creates a 
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channel through which offenders rapidly learn from their experiences with the criminal justice 
system and trigger an upward revision of the perceived probability of punishment.  
Plea Bargaining 
Finally, the reform introduced plea bargaining into Colombia to increase the number of 
convictions. As mentioned previously, the literature has associated plea negotiations with shorter 
sentences. Since our data does not allow for the evaluation of the effect of the reform on sentence 
length, we estimate whether an increase in convictions occurred and if it is associated with guilty 
pleas instead of trial outcomes. First, we evaluate the impact of the reform in sentencing. Table 10 
presents the results using the dependent variable in Equation 6. These findings suggest that the 
LACPR increased both the number of acquittals and convictions. These results confirm that the 
reform successfully increased the efficiency of the Colombian criminal justice system.  
[Table 10 Here] 
While the literature has traditionally associated improvements in procedural efficiency 
with lower crime rates, the Colombian case seems to suggest a different story. The explanation 
behind this discrepancy could be related to the type of convictions obtained. Table 11 indicates 
that the increase in convictions occurred because of guilty pleas and not trial convictions. The 
results in Table 11 show that while acquittals in trial increased, trial convictions decreased for 
homicides or did not change for other offenses.  
[Table 11 Here] 
In order to confirm that after the LACPR conviction sentences occurred via guilty pleas 
instead of trials, we compared the changes in the number of days between opening an investigation 
and a conviction/acquittal sentence.  Moreover, as discussed previously, Figure 5 reveals that the 
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gain in procedural efficiency only occurred in conviction sentences supporting the hypothesis of 
guilty pleas as the primary source of punishment after the LACPR.  
The association between shorter sentences and plea bargaining could explain why, despite 
increasing the number of convictions and procedural efficiency, Colombia experienced an increase 
in crime. Another hypothesis connects the increase in the use of prison without resocialization 
programs with higher crime rates in the long-run (Pritikin 2008; Shepherd 2006; Spelman 2008). 
Zorro-Medina (2020b) study on the LACPR effects on incarceration rates suggests that the number 
of persons that enter prisons increased, specially re-offenders, confirming that an increase in 
imprisonment occurred in the country.  
VIII. CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION 
Criminology literature identifies Latin America as one of the most violent regions in the world 
(Bergman 2018; Müller 2018; Soares and Naritomi 2010). This has attracted attention to the study 
of crime in Latin American. However, most of this research has focused on how the economic 
(Fajnzylber et al. 1998; Soares 2004; Soares and Naritomi 2010), social (Bergman 2006; Di Tella 
and Schargrodsky 2004; Soares and Naritomi 2010), and institutional (Dammert 2012; Malone 
2010; Müller 2018; Schultze-Kraft et al. 2018) factors influence illegal behavior. Yet, the research 
on Latin American crime tends to ignore the effects of criminal procedural law on crime. In this 
paper, we explore the most extensive Latin American procedural reform in the last two centuries 
and its impact on the soaring crime rates over the last 30-years. Some researchers have documented 
the relationship between procedural law and crime in the region (Soares and Sviatschi 2010). 
Nonetheless, the consequences of adopting an adversarial system using the U.S. model continue 
highly unexplored decades after the LACPR. 
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In this paper, we use the literature developed mostly for the U.S. and European cases to explore 
the consequences that adopting the U.S. adversarial model had on crime rates in Latin American. 
We identify the three mechanisms that connect procedural law and crime: i) celerity, ii) certainty, 
and iii) severity of punishment. The LACPR affected these three channels simultaneously since 
adversariality implied a radical transformation of the Latin American penal process, theoretically 
altering the offender’s and law enforcement agents’ incentives significantly.  
For our analysis, we group the primary changes into nine categories (Figure 6). Using our 
theoretical framework, we predict that the reform caused ambiguous effects on criminal behavior. 
On the celerity side, we distinguish a procedural length decrease during the post-imputation phase, 
but an increase in the pre-imputation stage. Empirically, when we calculate the overall effect on 
celerity, we found that the LACPR reduced substantially the length of the process. From this 
perspective, we anticipated a reduction in crime rates following the previous empirical findings 
(Dalla Pellegrina 2008; Dušek and Traxler 2016; Soares and Sviatschi 2010).  
On the certainty side, we identify three different changes in the probability of punishment. 
First, a reduction in the likelihood of apprehension occurred since the police responded to the 
stricter arrest rules with a decrease in the arrest rates (Atkins and Rubin 2003; Hausman and 
Kronick 2019). Secondly, a reduction in the probability of being charged occurred since the stricter 
imputation rules created incentives for prosecutors to settle more and present fewer formal charges. 
As we show an increase in settlements occurred while a reduction in the clearance rate happened 
after the LACPR. Lastly, we find an increase in the probability of conviction since the efficiency 
of the system improved. Our findings align with Zorro-Medina (2020b) results on the rise in prison 
convictions and entries to Colombian prisons after the LACPR.   
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Following the existing literature on certainty, we predicted an increase in crime rates since 
previous scholars associate apprehension likelihood with a stringer effect on criminal behavior 
(Nagin 2013a; Nagin et al. 2015; Wilson and McLaren 1972b). However, we distinguish between 
criminal behavior and crime rates. The first one, we associated with actual illegal activity and the 
second one with how societies measure crime (Black 1970). Hence, we predicted an increase in 
offenses linked to reactive policing work and a decrease in proactive policing.  
Finally, on the severity side, we expected an increase in crime rates, particularly in those crimes 
with a settlement hearing requirement. The reform affected the perceived value of the sanction 
without changing any formal penalty in the Penal Code. By introducing alternatives forms to 
terminate the process, first avoiding a criminal charge and second before trial, the adversariality 
negotiation component opened the door to impose less severe penalties. We show that the 
productivity increase seems to be driven by guilty pleas instead of convictions in a trial (see Figure 
5).  Consequently, we expected an increase in criminal behavior. 
After estimating our event study and difference-in-difference models, we confirmed that the 
LACPR caused an increase in overall crime of 22% and 34% after 12-month exposure, indicating 
that the incentives to engage in criminal activity from the decrease in certainty and severity 
surpassed the deterrence effect of productivity and celerity. As expected, the results vary across 
different offenses. For sexual crimes, we find no statistically significant impact. We hypothesize 
that no changes in the report of sexual crimes occurred. Moreover, we understand these offenders 
are notably different from other criminals since the literature has traditionally associated these 




For the other violent crimes, we observe a dramatic increase in assault rates (25%-30%), while 
a small change in homicides occurred (3%-4%). The settlement mechanism can explain the 
variation between these offenses. While assault cases require a settlement hearing, homicide 
imputations proceed without it. These differences reveal the weight settlements potentially had on 
Colombian crime rates.  
Moving to drug offenses, the results confirm our prediction. Comparing Figures 8 and 9, we 
observe similar patterns between the arrest rate contraction and drug crime rates decrease. 
Contrasting drug and sexual offenses, we notice the literature distinction between proactive and 
reactive policing in crime rates measurement. Our findings do not suggest that drug offenses 
dropped, rather than since these activities depend on policing activity, all we capture in these 
measures is detection instead of criminal behavior (Black 1970). 
Finally, for property crime, our estimations reveal that the LACPR increased muggings by 9%-
22%, business robberies by 4%-9%, vehicle thefts 1%-2%, and home burglaries by 6%-11%. For 
these offenses, we recognize different incentives operated at the same time. Since these crimes 
depend on reactive policing, we anticipated this increase. According to the literature, the changes 
in policing incentives caused a reduction in arrests, which trigged revisions on the perceived 
likelihood apprehension. Still, the increase in the probability of conviction and prison could have 
potentially deterred these criminal activities. In this case, our data does not allow us to separate 
both effects. However, the final observed increase suggests that for these property crimes, a 
decrease in the probability of apprehension or detection surpasses the weight of an increase in the 
















Figure 3. The LACPR in Colombia  
 
1 3 42
Office of the Attorney General  & Judicial Police Trial Judge
1 3 42
Pre-Investigation Stage Pre-Trial Stage Oral & Public Trial Stage






3 Days- 4 Months
Pre-Investigation Stage Pre-Trial Stage Written & Private Trial Stage
 
 
Figure 4. Procedural Length Reduction in Colombia after the LACPR 
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Figure 7. Leads-and-Lags Results for Aggregated Measures 
 
 
Figure 8. Leads-and-Lags Results Violent and Drug Offenses 
 
 








Figure 11. Leads-and-Lags Pre-Treatment Evaluation for Control Variables 
 
 
Table 1.  Minimum and Maximum Sentence Length Colombian Penal Code 
Crime Min Max Average (𝑝𝑠) 
Homicides 13 40 27 
Assaults 1 15 8 
Muggings 1 16 9 
Business Robberies 2 28 15 
Home Burglaries 6 14 10 
Vehicle Thefts 7 15 11 
Total 30 128 80 
      Colombian Penal Code 2007, Articles 103, 111-116, 239-241. 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics Variables in Main Results 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Unweighted Crime* 78,894 14.99 23.58 0 834.33 
Crime Index* 78,894 2.57 4.19 0 134.42 
Violent Crime Index* 78,894 4.11 8.34 0 307.25 
Property Crime Index* 78,894 1.37 3.03 0 93.73 
Homicides* 78,894 3.76 9.76 0 374.90 
Assaults* 78,894 5.29 12.57 0 834.33 
Sexual Offenses* 62,977 4.49 8.44 0 232.29 
Drug Offenses*  62,977 3.51 9.77 0 941.37 
Muggings* 78,894 2.92 8.16 0 286.81 
Business Robberies* 78,894 0.96 3.51 0 99.50 
Vehicle Thefts* 78,894 0.43 2.30 0 183.53 
Home Burglaries* 78,894 1.63 5.68 0 191.94 
Arrests* 78,894 1.52 1.53 0 6.77 
% Rural Population 78,894 1.05 0.65 0 4.09 
Education Investment  77,660 3.55 0.94 0 12.34 
Industry Tax Revenue 78,810 0.01 0.03 0 0.52 
Fiscal Performance 77,790 4.08 0.16 2.52 4.51 
Population Density 78,894 3.85 1.23 0.14 9.58 
Forced Displacement Expulsion 78,918 3.83 2.11 0 9.63 
Forced Displacement Reception 78,918 3.07 2.24 0 10.61 
*Per 100,000 Inhabitants           
 
 
Table 3. Conditional Event Study Results During the Pre-Treatment Period (2003-2004) 
Months Before Implementation 





















12 Months 0.045 0.039 0.068* -0.022 0.075* -0.069 -0.063* -0.039 0.004 -0.002 -0.018 0.007 
 (0.051) (0.029) (0.039) (0.024) (0.039) (0.052) (0.038) (0.032) (0.026) (0.016) (0.029) (0.046) 
11 Months 0.036 0.022 0.049 -0.002 0.007 0.089 0.016 -0.008 -0.032 0.011 0.025 0.065 
 (0.066) (0.037) (0.049) (0.028) (0.052) (0.066) (0.046) (0.037) (0.032) (0.022) (0.037) (0.058) 
10 Months -0.043 -0.041 -0.100** 0.041 -0.071 -0.052 0.009 0.103** -0.032 -0.032 0.045 -0.073 
 (0.068) (0.038) (0.050) (0.029) (0.051) (0.062) (0.047) (0.040) (0.031) (0.023) (0.036) (0.058) 
9 Months -0.008 0.011 0.065 -0.039 0.050 0.056 -0.094* -0.111*** 0.023 -0.017 -0.009 0.059 
 (0.066) (0.037) (0.050) (0.029) (0.051) (0.063) (0.053) (0.040) (0.028) (0.021) (0.035) (0.056) 
8 Months 0.079 0.055 0.027 0.040 0.028 0.000 0.039 0.110*** 0.027 0.020 -0.020 0.004 
 (0.066) (0.037) (0.050) (0.027) (0.051) (0.063) (0.047) (0.039) (0.027) (0.020) (0.034) (0.057) 
7 Months -0.027 -0.028 -0.025 0.010 -0.036 -0.088 0.044 -0.020 -0.004 0.017 0.056* 0.022 
 (0.062) (0.034) (0.048) (0.026) (0.049) (0.067) (0.049) (0.038) (0.027) (0.021) (0.033) (0.054) 
6 Months -0.076 -0.025 -0.006 -0.057** 0.035 -0.021 -0.067 -0.077** -0.026 0.020 -0.077** -0.066 
 (0.062) (0.034) (0.047) (0.026) (0.048) (0.062) (0.050) (0.039) (0.027) (0.020) (0.033) (0.052) 
5 Months -0.018 -0.025 -0.066 0.045 -0.088* 0.013 -0.039 0.025 0.041 0.004 0.059* 0.016 
 (0.066) (0.036) (0.048) (0.028) (0.049) (0.062) (0.049) (0.041) (0.028) (0.021) (0.033) (0.053) 
4 Months 0.015 0.014 0.006 -0.000 0.018 0.042 0.028 0.009 0.014 -0.033* -0.039 -0.027 
 (0.066) (0.036) (0.048) (0.029) (0.050) (0.063) (0.048) (0.042) (0.030) (0.020) (0.035) (0.054) 
3 Months 0.004 0.012 0.073 -0.054* 0.045 0.007 -0.029 -0.049 -0.051* 0.013 -0.026 0.039 
 (0.063) (0.035) (0.047) (0.028) (0.048) (0.065) (0.048) (0.041) (0.029) (0.020) (0.035) (0.054) 
2 Months -0.137** -0.068** -0.118** 0.016 -0.031 0.076 0.021 0.039 0.021 -0.007 0.012 -0.159*** 
 (0.062) (0.035) (0.047) (0.027) (0.049) (0.064) (0.047) (0.039) (0.029) (0.021) (0.033) (0.053) 
1 Month 0.093 0.035 0.048 0.012 0.036 -0.142** -0.057 0.003 0.006 -0.007 -0.009 0.064 
  (0.064) (0.035) (0.047) (0.027) (0.048) (0.062) (0.046) (0.042) (0.026) (0.021) (0.033) (0.053) 
Observations 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 60,882 60,882 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 
R-squared 0.359 0.333 0.279 0.401 0.275 0.198 0.452 0.381 0.287 0.236 0.289 0.270 
Year Month & Month-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls: Per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, density of population, rural index, displaced population, and police arrest. 
Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4. Difference-in-Difference Results for Aggregated Measures 
 
VARIABLES 
Panel A Panel B 


















                  
LACPR 0.195*** 0.110*** 0.141*** 0.081*** 0.169*** 0.097*** 0.135*** 0.062*** 
  (0.031) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.030) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) 
Time Exposure LACPR         0.012*** 0.006*** 0.002* 0.009*** 
          (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
                  
Constant -2.765* -1.971** -2.065** -1.131 -4.306*** -2.734*** -2.381** -2.233*** 
  (1.431) (0.829) (1.013) (0.689) (1.521) (0.893) (1.051) (0.716) 
                  
Observations 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 
R-squared 0.359 0.333 0.279 0.400 0.360 0.333 0.279 0.403 
Year Month & Month-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipio FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Mean T=0 13.52 2.45 4.1 1.16 13.52 2.45 4.1 1.16 
Effect of LACPR 22% 12% 15% 8% 34% 18% 17% 18% 
Controls: Per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, density of population, rural index, displaced population, and police 
















Panel A Panel B 










                  
LACPR 0.034* 0.221*** -0.007 -0.297*** 0.035** 0.207*** -0.009 -0.318*** 
  (0.018) (0.029) (0.023) (0.026) (0.017) (0.028) (0.022) (0.026) 
Time Exposure LACPR         -0.000 0.006*** 0.001 0.012*** 
          (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
                  
Constant -2.557*** -0.366 1.869* 1.237 -2.493*** -1.168 1.740* -0.358 
  (0.946) (1.194) (1.000) (1.542) (0.964) (1.249) (1.012) (1.757) 
                  
Observations 75,976 75,976 60,882 60,882 75,976 75,976 60,882 60,882 
R-squared 0.274 0.269 0.197 0.450 0.274 0.270 0.197 0.452 
Year Month & Month-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipio FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Mean T=0 3.98 4.52 4.13 2.93 3.98 4.52 4.13 2.93 
Effect of LACPR 3% 25% 0% -26% 4% 30% 0% -12% 
Controls: Per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, density of population, rural index, displaced population, and police 













Panel A Panel B 














                  
LACPR 0.083*** 0.043*** 0.016** 0.057*** 0.054** 0.032** 0.018** 0.045** 
  (0.025) (0.014) (0.008) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) (0.008) (0.018) 
Time Exposure LACPR         0.013*** 0.005*** -0.001* 0.005*** 
          (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
                  
Constant -1.664* -2.209*** 1.241*** -1.973*** -3.372*** -2.844*** 1.362*** -2.674*** 
  (0.989) (0.621) (0.359) (0.684) (1.067) (0.697) (0.388) (0.708) 
                  
Observations 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 75,976 
R-squared 0.381 0.287 0.235 0.289 0.383 0.288 0.235 0.290 
Year Month & Month-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipio FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Mean T=0 2.42 0.77 0.44 1.40 2.42 0.77 0.44 1.40 
Effect of LACPR 9% 4% 2% 6% 22% 9% 1% 11% 
Controls: Per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, density of population, rural index, displaced population, and police 














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Panel A           
LACPR -4.087*** -3.187*** -11.133*** -9.592*** -5.879*** 
  (0.709) (0.533) (1.672) (1.216) (0.541) 
            
Constant 47.777 91.322** 13.657 181.352** 60.042 
 (46.582) (37.415) (121.221) (80.524) (43.029) 
R-squared 0.387 0.484 0.416 0.431 0.603 
            
Panel B           
LACPR -4.069*** -3.164*** -10.883*** -9.580*** -5.886*** 
  (0.707) (0.534) (1.678) (1.222) (0.544) 
Time Exposure LACPR 0.087 0.104** 0.347*** 0.032 -0.035 
  (0.058) (0.045) (0.132) (0.086) (0.051) 
            
Constant 32.626 73.122** -54.751 175.847** 66.105 
 (47.613) (36.102) (119.325) (83.018) (44.247) 
R-squared 0.388 0.486 0.417 0.431 0.603 
            
Observations 31,760 32,064 26,267 31,169 32,035 
Year Month & Month-Year 
FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipio FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Mean T=0 17.21 13.50 70.74 39.03 21.94 
Controls: Per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, density of population, 













Table 8. Difference-in-Difference Results for Pre-trial Detention 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Pre-trial Detention in Jail           
LACPR -7.604*** -1.389* -6.160*** -1.626 -0.996** 
 (1.599) (0.789) (1.069) (1.287) (0.466) 
            
Constant 82.727 35.572 -12.566 7.041 -2.876 
  (95.869) (50.015) (78.294) (76.739) (28.874) 
R-squared 0.127 0.106 0.149 0.111 0.109 
Mean T=0 22.13 8.100 19.22 17.36 3.034 
            
Pre-trial Detention in House 
Arrests           
LACPR 1.375*** 0.938*** 3.507*** 1.868*** 0.327** 
  (0.359) (0.266) (0.481) (0.408) (0.157) 
            
Constant -10.166 19.811 -17.328 10.563 2.983 
  (20.060) (15.463) (31.068) (17.883) (6.278) 
R-squared 0.139 0.098 0.099 0.118 0.065 
Mean T=0 0.156 0.187 1.335 0.671 0.0705 
            
Total Pre-trial Detention            
LACPR -6.229*** -0.451 -2.653** 0.242 -0.669 
  (1.644) (0.815) (1.191) (1.345) (0.494) 
            
Constant 72.561 55.383 -29.894 17.605 0.107 
  (90.259) (53.414) (86.561) (78.756) (29.012) 
R-squared 0.127 0.107 0.140 0.111 0.106 
Mean T=0 22.28 8.287 20.55 18.03 3.105 
Observations 11,200 14,857 14,004 12,098 17,554 
Year Month & Month-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipio FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls: Per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, density of population, rural index, 






Table 9. Difference-in-Difference Results for Settlements (Pre-Imputation) 
 
VARIABLES 
Panel A Panel B 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Property Crimes Assaults Property Crimes Assaults 
          
LACPR 1.096*** 10.445*** 1.102*** 10.555*** 
  (0.216) (0.702) (0.217) (0.702) 
Time Exposure LACPR     0.026* 0.516*** 
      (0.016) (0.066) 
          
Constant 2.728 122.513** -1.822 32.007 
  (14.045) (54.729) (14.391) (57.720) 
          
Observations 32,064 32,035 32,064 32,035 
R-squared 0.403 0.591 0.403 0.605 
Year Month & Month-Year 
FE YES YES YES YES 
Municipio FE YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Mean T=0 2.572 15.78 2.572 15.78 
Controls: Per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, 
density of population, rural index, displaced population, and police arrest. Robust cluster standard errors in 




















Table 10. Difference-in-Difference Results for Total Acquittals and Convictions 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Total Acquittals           
Panel A           
LACPR 0.131** 0.010 0.580*** 0.513*** 0.055** 
  (0.062) (0.030) (0.162) (0.186) (0.025) 
Constant 0.358 5.498* -5.461 -3.034 2.313 
  (2.942) (3.186) (9.426) (11.335) (1.854) 
R-squared 0.362 0.371 0.466 0.398 0.222 
Panel B           
LACPR 0.135** 0.012 0.595*** 0.533*** 0.056** 
  (0.062) (0.030) (0.160) (0.184) (0.025) 
Time Exposure LACPR 0.017*** 0.007** 0.021** 0.058*** 0.008*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.014) (0.002) 
Constant -2.627 4.215 -9.511 -13.059 0.949 
  (2.976) (2.870) (9.847) (11.289) (1.978) 
R-squared           
Mean T=0 0.0305 0.00943 0.0363 0.0257 0.0199 
Observations 31,760 32,064 26,267 31,169 32,035 
Total Convictions           
Panel A           
LACPR 0.287*** 0.110* 0.139* 0.166 0.125 
  (0.081) (0.058) (0.081) (0.112) (0.081) 
Constant -1.682 -0.782 0.396 3.470 -3.740 
  (8.421) (5.417) (7.305) (8.049) (6.501) 
R-squared           
Panel B           
LACPR 0.271*** 0.088* 0.166* 0.147 0.139 
  (0.081) (0.045) (0.084) (0.114) (0.089) 
Time Exposure LACPR -0.003 -0.004 0.005 -0.003 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant -0.559 0.958 -0.747 3.791 -4.824 
  (8.249) (5.171) (7.160) (8.078) (5.944) 
R-squared 0.472 0.391 0.525 0.438 0.471 
Mean T=0 0.130 0.0934 0.0737 0.101 0.138 
Observations 1,068 1,314 1,002 1,431 947 
Year Month & Month-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipio FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls: Per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, density of population, 
rural index, displaced population, and police arrest. Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 11. Difference-in-Difference Results for Acquittals and Convictions in Court (Trial) 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Acquittals in Court           
Panel A           
LACPR 1.418*** 1.011*** 9.923*** 2.978*** 0.775*** 
  (0.208) (0.151) (0.855) (0.435) (0.119) 
Constant 3.253 33.051*** 182.907*** 74.526*** 23.305*** 
  (15.711) (8.273) (70.551) (26.526) (7.972) 
R-squared 0.397 0.424 0.542 0.388 0.320 
Panel B           
LACPR 1.445*** 1.029*** 10.457*** 3.063*** 0.782*** 
  (0.207) (0.154) (0.873) (0.436) (0.120) 
Time Exposure LACPR 0.127*** 0.081*** 0.743*** 0.242*** 0.033*** 
  (0.017) (0.010) (0.059) (0.031) (0.009) 
Constant -19.001 18.940** 36.474 32.388 17.596** 
  (16.089) (7.765) (71.087) (25.045) (8.059) 
R-squared 0.407 0.442 0.569 0.403 0.323 
Mean T=0 0.163 0.0925 0.429 0.419 0.109 
Observations 31,760 32,064 26,267 31,169 32,035 
Convictions in Court           
Panel A           
LACPR -0.287*** -0.110* -0.139* -0.166 -0.125 
  (0.081) (0.058) (0.081) (0.112) (0.081) 
Constant 2.682 1.782 0.604 -2.470 4.740 
  (8.421) (5.417) (7.305) (8.049) (6.501) 
R-squared 0.472 0.391 0.525 0.438 0.471 
Panel B           
LACPR -0.271*** -0.088* -0.166* -0.147 -0.139 
  (0.081) (0.045) (0.084) (0.114) (0.089) 
Time Exposure LACPR 0.003 0.004 -0.005 0.003 -0.004 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 1.559 0.042 1.747 -2.791 5.824 
  (8.249) (5.171) (7.160) (8.078) (5.944) 
R-squared 0.472 0.393 0.526 0.438 0.471 
Mean T=0 0.870 0.907 0.926 0.899 0.862 
Observations 1,068 1,314 1,002 1,431 947 
Year Month & Month-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipio FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls: Per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, density of population, rural 
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Robustness & Placebo Tests 
We estimated two falsification tests. Our first test consisted of evaluating our model during the 
pre-treatment period following the Colombian implementation order. As mentioned in the paper, 
the lag-structure used in the difference-in-difference model does not allow us to use the pre-
treatment period directly since 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 is not comparable to 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−2. Thus, we estimated all our results 
excluding 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑤  confirming that these findings are robust to these changes. After checking these, 
we proceeded to evaluate our placebo test. Table 1A shows the main results excluding 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑤 and 
the respective calculation for the placebo treatment.  
 In the second falsification test, we randomly assigned all Colombian municipalities to 
different waves and estimated if our results come from chance. After 100-estimations, we do not 
find a consistent pattern indicating spurious results. Table 2A contains the average values of the 












Table 1A. Robustness Check without 𝒁𝒊,𝒕−𝒘 and Falsification 2003-2004 
 











Panel A:             
LACPR 0.311*** 0.162*** 0.190*** 0.119*** 0.051*** 0.301*** 
  (0.031) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.029) 
              
Observations 77,094 77,094 77,094 77,094 77,094 77,094 
R-square 0.431 0.379 0.302 0.441 0.276 0.320 
              
Panel B:             
LACPR 0.280*** 0.146*** 0.183*** 0.098*** 0.051*** 0.284*** 
  (0.030) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.028) 
Exposure LACPR 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.003** 0.009*** -0.000 0.007*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
              
Observations -5.147*** -3.096*** -2.913*** -2.372*** -2.647*** -2.085* 
R-square (1.484) (0.884) (1.044) (0.697) (0.960) (1.234) 
              
  77,094 77,094 77,094 77,094 77,094 77,094 
  0.432 0.380 0.303 0.443 0.276 0.321 
Panel A:             
Placebo -0.127*** -0.078*** -0.127*** -0.003 -0.084*** -0.119*** 
  (0.031) (0.019) (0.026) (0.014) (0.027) (0.028) 
              
Observations 25,689 25,689 25,689 25,689 25,689 25,689 
R-square 0.502 0.438 0.356 0.532 0.322 0.372 
       
Panel B:             
Placebo -0.122*** -0.074*** -0.124*** -0.002 -0.073*** -0.129*** 
  (0.031) (0.019) (0.026) (0.013) (0.028) (0.028) 
Exposure Placebo 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.007* -0.007* 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) (0.004) 
             
Observations 25,689 25,689 25,689 25,689 25,689 25,689 
R-square 0.502 0.438 0.356 0.532 0.322 0.372 
Year Month & 
Month-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipio FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls: Per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, 
density of population, rural index and displaced population. Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses. Exposure 
time of LACPR calculated using 12 months of exposure. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 











































Controls: Per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, 
density of population, rural index and displaced population. Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses. Exposure 
time of LACPR calculated using 12 months of exposure. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 













Panel A:             
LACPR -0.013 -0.295*** 0.122*** 0.063*** 0.019** 0.082*** 
  (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.014) (0.008) (0.019) 
              
Observations 61,671 61,671 77,094 77,094 77,094 77,094 
R-square 0.197 0.450 0.404 0.300 0.236 0.304 
              
Panel B:             
LACPR -0.015 -0.318*** 0.090*** 0.051*** 0.021*** 0.069*** 
  (0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.014) (0.008) (0.018) 
Exposure LACPR 0.001 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.005*** -0.001* 0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
Observations 1.786* -0.125 -3.417*** -2.906*** 1.408*** -2.852*** 
R-square (1.002) (1.776) (1.051) (0.707) (0.387) (0.707) 
              
  61,671 61,671 77,094 77,094 77,094 77,094 
  0.197 0.452 0.407 0.301 0.236 0.305 
Panel A:             
Placebo 0.047 0.016 0.018 0.001 -0.026** 0.002 
  (0.030) (0.024) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) 
              
Observations 19,146 19,146 25,689 25,689 25,689 25,689 
R-square 0.286 0.509 0.480 0.351 0.278 0.380 
       
Panel B:             
Placebo 0.041 0.035 0.023 -0.005 -0.028** 0.006 
  (0.030) (0.023) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) 
Exposure Placebo -0.003 0.011*** 0.004 -0.004** -0.002 0.003 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
             
Observations 19,146 19,146 25,689 25,689 25,689 25,689 
R-square 0.286 0.509 0.480 0.351 0.278 0.380 
Year Month & 
Month-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipio FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 
Table 2A.  Randomization Falsification Test-Average Calculations 100-Estimations 
 















Panel A:                   
Placebo -0.027 -0.049 0 -0.024 -0.053 0.036 -0.007 -0.023 0.013 
  (0.047) (0.06) (0.051) (0.036) (0.083) (0.067) (0.029) (0.043) (0.019) 
                    
                    
Observations 76,189 76,189 76,189 76,189 76,189 76,189 76,189 76,189 76,189 
R-square 0.331 0.277 0.399 0.274 0.267 0.381 0.286 0.289 0.235 
                    
Panel B:                   
Placebo -0.024 -0.048 0.003 -0.024 -0.053 0.037 -0.003 -0.02 0.009 
  (0.045) (0.058) (0.05) (0.034) (0.079) (0.066) (0.029) (0.042) (0.017) 
                    
Exposure Placebo -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0 0 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.003*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
                   
Observations 76,189 76,189 76,189 76,189 76,189 76,189 76,189 76,189 76,189 
R-square 0.331 0.277 0.4 0.274 0.267 0.381 0.287 0.289 0.236 
Year Month & Month-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipio FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls: Per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, density of population, rural index, and displaced population. Robust 
cluster standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
